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The Narrowing of the Mainstream - DornbuschlFischerlStartz, the History of 
Economic Thought, and the Russian Malaise 
Wolfgang Zank 
Aalborg University 
Some textbooks can be seen as representing the 'state of the art'. Of course, also outsiders write 
textbooks. But if the authors are academics of the highest reputation, and if the textbooks are 
used in many universities throughout the world, then they represent and shape the 'mainstream' , 
i.e. the intellectual current which has united most brains in academic economics in the Western 
world. 'Mainstream's ' representatives talk and think in very similar ways all around the globe, 
and many policy recommendations are conceptualized in 'mainstream' terms. This makes 
'mainstream' a powerful political force. 
Macroeconomics ofRiidiger Dornbusch, Stanley Fischer and Richard Startz1 deserves particular 
interest. 'Rudi' Dornbusch holds a chair at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 
one of the most prestigious institutions in the world, and Stanley Fischer, also of MIT, has for 
many years been First Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
one of the most powerful institutions in the world. And discussing political power: On several 
occasions the authors approvingly quote Lawrence H. Summers, of Harvard University, whom 
we can regard as their intellectual fellow-in-arms. In 1999, Summers has been appointed 
Secretary of the Treasury of the United States of America. 
I Rudiger Dornbusch, Stanley Fischer, Richard Startz, Macroeconomics, 7" edition, Irwin Mc Graw-Hill, 1998. 
'Macroeconomics' can boast a global distribution2• Furthennore, on the international market 
it is accompanied by the bulky Economics3, which has a large overlap with Macroecono nics. 
In this paper, we relate the book to some milestones in the development of economic thOought. 
As we shall see, there are points of continuity, and of profound divergence. It is also interesting 
to notice which issues DombuschlFischerlStartz do not write about, in contrast to their 
predecessors. When briefly presenting the main schools in the history of economi c thought, we 
give comparatively ample space to Classical Political Economy, thereby discussing some 
fundamental problems. Finally, we compare the perspectives which we have encountered with 
those of DombuschlFischerlStartz. We notice that the intellectual focus of economics has 
narrowed substantially during the last 150 years. This can be seen as a case of intellectual 
division ofIabor which enhances productivity. But it can also constitute the basis of serious 
errors. Russia in the 1990s, where Stanley Fischer has been involved, is a case in point. 
Classical Political Economy 
Political Economy was a child of the Enlightenment. Around 1750, traditional forms of 
economic regulation were increasingly felt to be inadequate. Numerous European authors 
endeavored to find ways to organize human productive activities in a more rational way. rhese 
activities found a first culmination in 1776, with the publication of An Inquiry into the Causes 
and the Nature o/the Wealth o/Nations, by Adam Smith. 
Adam Smith, belonging to the Scottish School of the Enlightenment, was the first author who 
integrated a wide range of economic reasoning into a coherent system. At the same tirne he 
supplied political liberalism with a powerful intellectual weapon. Smith identified the division 
ofIabor as the main source of wealth. Human activity is more productive when it is special ized. 
2 See the preface, ibid., p. xviif. 
'David Begg, Stanley Fischer, Rudiger Dornbusch, Economics, 4" edition, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1994. 
2 
But someone who produces just one item (e.g. shoes) can only exist ifhe/she can exchange his 
produce with other products (e.g. food) . Specialization is only possible if there is a market. 
Limits to the extent of the market limit the extent of specialization, and thereby of the national 
wealth. This implies that enlarging markets, removing barriers for the free circulation of goods 
have beneficial effects. In Smith's view, traditional regulations that, for instance, prescribed that 
only the members of guilds and corporations were allowed to practice certain trades and crafts, 
were only introduced in order to secure high incomes for the members of these corporation-
at the expense of those who were outside. And those outside were mainly the poor. 'The 
patrimony of a poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his hands; and to hinder him trom 
employing this strength and dexterity ... is a plain violation of this most sacred property". In 
a similar vein, he criticized the administration of the Poor Laws. Every parish was obliged to 
feed its poor, and it was therefore interested in restricting the settlement of new poor. 'There 
is scarce a poor man in England of forty years of age ... who has not in some part of his life felt 
himself most cruelly oppressed by this ill-contrived law of settlement' s. The freedom of 
circulation was therefore, in Smith's view, also a question of elementary social justice. 
Not least human 'self-love' could playa socially very positive role: 'It is not from the 
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, the baker that we expect our dinner, but from the regard 
of their interests. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never 
talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages. Nobody but a beggar chooses to 
depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens'6. 
If economic liberty was installed, profits would converge to their 'natural' rate, i.e. an average 
rate. If profits were higher in one trade than in another, capital would flow to the more 
'Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations Books I-/JI, Penguin Classics, Hannondsworth, 1990,p. 225 . 
J Ibid. , p. 245. 
, Ibid. , p. 119. 
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profitable one, raising production and depressing prices there, until there would be the Sill-me 
profit in all trades. The wages would converge to a 'natural' average level as well; were the 
wages higher in one parish than in another one, the workers would move to the occupation that 
was better remunerated. Also rent, i.e. the income which landowners could demand for the "1lISe 
of their land, would converge to a 'natural rate'. 
Profits, wages, and rents were the components of the prices, and if they converged to their 
natural rates, the prices would be 'natural prices' . In a given situation, the actual price, the 
'market price' could of course be higher orlower, but only for a limited time: 'The marketpr::ice 
of any particular commodity ... can seldom continue long below its natural price. Whatever part 
of it was paid below the natural rate, the persons whose interest it affected, would imlll.ediately 
feel the loss, and would immediately withdraw either so much land, or so much labor, or::- so 
much stock [capital]' 7 until the natural price was restored. And: 'The natural price, tmerefore, 
is ... the central price, to which the prices of all commodities are continually gravitating's. The 
word 'gravitating' is perhaps no coincidence; the Scottish Philosophers wanted to construct a 
social science as 'objective' as Newton's physics. 
Wages, profits, and rent were the three main sources of income, which accrued to the three Dl!..ain 
classes of society, the workers, the capitalists, and the landlords. Most capitalists in Smith's 
system were farmers, who employed laborers, financed the necessary equipment, andhteldland 
in tenure from the landlords. This was a reflection of the peculiar British social structure _ In 
185 I some 4,000 landlords owned perhaps four-seventh of the land, which was cuhivated... by 
a quarter of a million capitalist fanners, who employed about 1,25 million laborers and 
servants9• On the Scottish highlands and in parts of Wales (and a few places in England), sm.all· 
, Ibid .. p . 165. 
, Ibid.. p. 160. 
9 Eric Hobsbawn. The Age of Revolution 1789-1848, New York and Scarborough/Ontario - London, 1962, p. 182 
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holders were still numerous, but Smith and most other classical economists excluded them fron 
their reasoning. 
In Smith's system, wages were linked to demography: !fa country was in progress, as it was 
the case with England, the wages were comparatively generous and allowed for more than just 
physical subsistence. The laborers could rear more surviving children, which in the end would 
lead to a surplus of laborers. Wages, therefore, had a long-run tendency to fall back to 
subsistence level. But this problem, for Smith, lay far aheadlO. 
Smith and other Scottish philosophers saw human society pass through distinct stages: Hunting, 
pasturage, farming, and commerce" . On every stage, the economy had a decisive impact on the 
other parts of society. As William Robertson formulated it: 'In every inquiry concerning the 
operations of men when united in society, the first object of attention should be the mode of 
subsistence. Accordingly as that varies, their laws and policy must be different' ' 2. In the Wealth 
of Nations, historical references are frequent. Smith regarded himself as a comprehensive 
philosophical thinker, for whom the advance of commerce and free competition were driven 
forward by the laws of history. 
Smith's book found a wide readership throughout Europe. In e.g. the Gennan states it made a 
strong impression on many civil servants and thereby helped to bring about the agrarian reforms 
in Prussia after 1807Jl. Christian Kraus, Kant's successor at the chair of philosophy in 
Konigsberg, told his students in 1796: 'Seit der Zeit des Neuen Testamentes hat kein Werk 
10 Smith, op. cit ... o. 172. 
11 As quoted by Andrew Skinner. Introduction to Smith. op. cit .• p. 31. 
l' Ibid. . p . 31. 
1) Daniel Winch. 'The Emergence of Economics as a Science' • Carlo Cipolla (ed.). The Fontana Economic History of 
Europe. vol. 3. The Industrial Revolution. Glasgow. 1975. p. 507-573. esp. p . 527. 
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segensreichere Wirkungen gehabt' 14. [NO book since the time of the New Testament mas e'bler 
produced such benevolent results]. 
But in 1798, Th. RobertI 5 Malthus, curate at the chapel at Okewood, Surrey, published a S!!Lall 
book which shook the prevailing optimism: An Essay on the Principle oj Popuiatio n, as;;:- it 
Affects the Future Improvement ojSociety, with Remarks on the Speculations of Mr. Godw i n, 
M. Condorcet , and Other Writers. In a melancholic tone, he drew the consequences of tie 
'fact' that improved living conditions led to an increase in population. Food prodllction col..3ld 
not be increased at the same rate: 'Population, when unchecked, increases in ageometric.al ratio. 
Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio ' t6. This meant that 'the human species wOl..3ld 
increase in the ratio of -1,2,4,8,16,32,64, 128,256,512, etc. and subsistence as- 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, etc' 17. Food production could not be increased faster because more and m=re 
land of poor quality had to be taken into cultivation. Obviously, after a few generati ons t=11e 
population would be by far too numerous in comparison to the available means of subsistence. 
'Positive checks' such as diseases and famine every now and then cruelly reduced the number 
of human beings. But there were also 'preventive checks': By behaving prudently, many- people 
restricted the number of births. But this was not sufficient to make humankind escape from de 
tragic circle of improving living conditions, popUlation increase, and the return of misery. !:he 
British Poor Laws made everything worse because parish assistance made the poor lrlultiply 
imprudently. He repeatedly proposed their gradual abolishment. 
/4 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte. Erster Band. Vom Feudalismus des Alten Reiches b is zvr 
Defensiven Modemisierung der Reformiira 1700-1815, Munchen, 2. AUf/age, 1989, p . 405. 
H His full name was Thomas Robert, but he was always called Robert, Or Bob. Patricia James, Population Malthus. er-iis 
Life and Times, London, Boston and Henley, 1979, p. 1. 
16 Thomas Malthus. An Essay on the Principle of Population, [First Essay), Penguin Classics, Harmondsworth 198::5. 
p . 71. 
17 Ibid. , p . 75. 
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In 1803 Malthus published a considerably enlarged version of the Essay; a sixth version was 
printed in 1826. During the debate, Malthus modified his position. His hypothesis could also 
be read: 'Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio'. MaIthus thereby 
became the first author to concentrate minds on the task of restricting population growth. 
According to him, people should marry late, and before marriage live strictly virtuously. Sexual 
desires were not to be suppressed, only to be regulated: 'Considering then the passions between 
the sexes in all its bearings and relations, . .. few will ... deny that it is one of the principal 
ingredients of human happiness. Yet experiences teaches us that much evil flows from the 
irregular gratification of it; . . . ' 18 He was, however - after all a priest by education - against the 
use of contraceptives. But not many years passed, and the tenn 'Malthusianism' became the 
label of a movement for family planning and the use of contraceptives, without Malthus being 
able to prevent it. 
In 1805 Malthus was appointed Professor of General History, Politics, Commerce and Finance 
at the college of the East India Company at Haileybury, Hertfordshire, thus becoming the first 
professional economist in the world. But gradually his fame became eclipsed by that of his 
friend David Ricardo, a London stock broker. With Ricardo, Political Economy gained 
substantially in consistency, precision, and logical abstraction. 
Ricardo's first subject were monetary problems. The exchange rate of sterling notes at financi al 
centers such as Amsterdam or Hamburg was in decline, and internally prices were rising. As 
many others, Ricardo attributed the depreciation to an excessive emission of paper bank notes 
by the Bank of England. In 1809 he published his first systematic pamphlet, The High Price of 
Bullion, a Proof of the Depreciation of Bank Notes. Malthus disagreed. In his Essay, 1803 
edition, he pointed to the country banks which could issue bank notes too (which could be 
" T R. Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population; or A View of its Past and Present Effects on Human 
Happiness; With an Inquiry into our Prospects Respecting the Future Removal or Mitigation of the Evils which it 
Dccaisions, [Second Essay) selected and introduced by Daniel Winch, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p . 212. 
7 
exchanged for Bank of England notes). And the country bank emissions were 'rather a 
consequence than a cause of the high price of provisions'; scarcity and the expenses for the P (Jar 
Laws created effects which were ' embarrassing, to a great degree, the operations of cornmeorce' 
19. In those debates the foundations of the so-called Quantity Theory of Money were establish ed. 
In 1815, when Parliament was about to introduce the Corn Laws, i.e. protective tariffs agl'l.inst 
the import of cheap foreign grain, Ricardo published a little pamphlet, An Essay on the 
Influence of a Low Price of Corn on the Profits ofStock!°. There he sketched a consistent the()ry 
of distribution and growth. The capitalist profit was detennined by the profits in agriculture: 
With some degree of abstraction, Ricardo made the agricultural produce consist (only) ()f grain. 
With a bit further abstraction, also the wages for the landlaborers, which Ricardo fixed at 
subsistence level, consisted of grain; at least, wages could be expressed in grain equi vale:I1ts. 
So could the other farming expenses. The rate of profit, then, was the relation between the 
product, expressed in grain, and the expenses for wages, implements, etc., equally expressed 
. . 
mgram. 
On poor land, the harvest was just sufficient to secure the ordinary profit rate for the fanner_No 
rent could be paid. Following Malthus' theory ofrent, Ricardo argued that on more fertile or 
better situated ground, the landlord could demand a higher rent. Also the rent coulcl. be 
expressed in grain units. With the passing oftime population would grow, and this meant -t:hat 
more and more land, of an ever declining quality, had to be cultivated. The fanners ()n h()se 
marginal lands inevitably had to face declining profits: They still had to pay subsistence wl'I.ges 
to their laborers, but the harvests, and thereby their profits, would decrease. This implied 1I:hat 
19 Ibid. P 197. 
" Ricardo 's writings are easibly accessible, thanks to an excellent edition: The Works and Corresponden ce 0, DaviLi 
Ricardo, edited by Piero SraJla, with the collaboration oj Maurice Dobb, 10 volumes, Cambridge University Press, 
1950·1972. Ricardo 's Essay on the Influence oj a Low Price oJCorn ... has recently been reprinted infacsimile, 
together with other pamphlets: Malthus, Ricardo, Torrens, West, Die 'Com-Law-Pamphlets ' von 1815, Faksimile· 
Edition 'Klassiker der National6konomie' , DUsseldorf, 1996. 
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the profit rate was to decline all over, it had to be the same in all branches. But the profits were 
the source of further productive accumulation, the motor of Britain ' s progress. Declining profits 
meant slower progress and eventualIy a stationary state. Only the landlords had reasons to he 
satisfied: As it became more difficult to produce grain, com prices would rise. So, on their 
fertile lands, they could extract higher and higher rents. 
Tariffs on cheap imported com kept the com prices at an artificially high level, to the delight 
of the landlords, but they depressed profits and obstructed Britain's progress. 'It folIows then, 
that the interest of the landlord is always opposed to the interest of every other class in the 
community,2 1. In other words, Ricardo saw a class struggle. 
In his main opus, On the Principles ofPoliticalEconorny and Taxation (1817), Ricardo retained 
the main lines of argumentation. Grain, however, was replaced by labor as the general measure. 
'The value of a commodity, or the quantity of any other commodity for which it will exchange, 
depends on the relative quantity oflabour which is necessary for its production .. .', read the 
title of chapter I, first section22 . This was the Labor Theory of Value. Of course, not only 'the 
labour applied immediately to commodities affect their value'; also the labor 'which is 
bestowed on the implements, tools, and buildings,23 must be counted. But seen this way, the 
prices - of course the 'natural prices' in the sense of Adam Smith - are proportional to the 
amount oflabor which is 'embodied' in the various steps in their production. 
The rate of profit occasions, however, a modification. Let us examine a fictive example. We 
compare two commodities, furniture and knives. In order to make furniture, trees had to be 
felled (which took 3 hours work); in a second step the wood was cut and assembled (7 hours). 
" Ricardo, An Essay on the Influence ... ,facsimile-edition (see footnote 17). p. 20. 
" The Works and Correspondence ... (footnote 17), volume 1, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, p. 
11. 
" Ibid. , p. 22. 
9 
All in all 10 hours of work were needed. As to knives, first the iron had to he producea::i (5 
hours), and then the knives could be wrought (also 5 hours). One hour costs unifcJ!mDy I 
shilling. If there were no profit, the final prices would be 10 shillings in both cases, i. e. they 
are proportional to the total labor input, as can be seen in the following calculation: 
Furniture Knives 
Labor input Price Labor input Price 
First step: Raw 3 hours-3 s. 3 s. 5 hours-5s. - 5s. 
material 
Final production 7 hours-7 s. 5 hours-5s. 
Total labor input, 10 hours 3 s.+7 s. -10 s. 10 hours 55+55-10 s. 
final price 
Table 1: The simple Labor Theory o/Value: Final prices in proportion to the total labor 
inputs. Assumption: No profit 
Now we assume that the raw materials were produced in year 1, and the final producti on took 
place in year 2. And in the price calculation at every step, we incorporate a profit of 10 percent: 
Furniture Knives 
Labor Input Price Lahor input Price 
Raw material 3 hours=3s. 3,3 s. 5 hours=5s. 5,5 s. 
Final production 7 hours- 7s. 5 hours-5s. 
Total lahor input 10 hours (3.3 s.+ 7s) x 10 hours (5,5s .+5s .)xL .1 
/ Final price 1.1 = 11,33 =11.55 
Table 2: Final prices, incorporating 10 per cent profit at every production step: Labor TllI~ory 
of value modified 
As we can see, the knives tum out slightly more expensive. Prices and total labor input are not 
in exact proportion any more. This effect is caused by the rate of profit, if the time distribution 
10 
of the labor input varies. We can also say: When the capital intensities in the final production 
varies. Consequently, the labor theory of value is, strictly speaking, only valid if the profit rate 
is zero. Furthennore, if we e.g. lowered the wages and raised the profits, the relative prices 
between 'furniture' and 'knives' would change even more, as the reader easily can find out by 
altering the figures in table 2. 
The amount of labor inputs can be interpreted as a function of the production techniques at a 
given time. Prices thus reflect these techniques, and the profit rate. 140 years after Ricardo, 
Piero Sraffa explored this perspective in a brilliant essay which became the founding document 
of the neo-Ricardian schooF4. 
Also in his Principles, Ricardo saw profits falling because land of poorer quality had to be 
cultivated. The free trade with consumption goods for laborers (such as grain) could, however, 
retard the decline of profits because it allowed lower wages. It was in this context that he 
exposed his famous model of Comparative Advantages. 
Ricardo 's abstract way of reasoning, isolating a few variables and then exploring them 
thoroughly, made a profound impact on Political Economy. But some had doubts. Richard 
Jones, who became Malthus' successor at the professorship at Haileybury, wrote that Ricardo 
overtook Malthus' theories on rent and popUlation and, ' overlooking altogether the limited 
extent of the field to which these principles were really applicable, undertook from them alone 
to deduce the laws which regulate the ... revenue derived from land at all places, and under all 
circumstances; and ... [he] proceeded from the same narrow and limited data, to construct a 
general system ... over the surface of the globe'25. A similar critique can perhaps be directed 
towards many economic works. 
" Piero Sraffa, Production oj Commodities by Means oj Commodities, Cambridge University Press, 1960. 
" Richard Jones, Essay on Rent, p vii, as quoted by James, op. cit., p . 286. 
11 
Malthus defended the Com Laws because he saw a danger that Britain might become depelX1den 
on foreign deliveries. Furthermore: 'The farmers, in some districts, have entirely los t the = little 
capital they possessed; and, unable to continue in their farms, have deserted them, and left:= their 
laborers without the means of employment ... In Ireland, it is quite certain, there atK""e no 
mercantile capitals ready to take up those persons who are thus thrown out ofw()rk, and even 
in Great Britain the transfer will be slow and difficult' 26 MaIthus thus did not reject the li- beral 
creed that, if cheap import destroyed occupation, other employment possibilities couDd be 
found. But he insisted that the difficulties of the transition must be taken seriously. Furtbe=ore, 
in his Principles of Political Economy Considered with a View to their Practical Applic=tion. 
(1820), Malthus attributed part of Britain's economic distress after 1815 toa 'greatdimin=tion 
of the whole amount of consumption and demand'. After the end of the Napoleonic 1JCV" ars, 
public demand (for guns, ships etc.) was reduced substantially. The taxes were IOI'-Tered 
accordingly, but unfortunately, 'very many persons have taken the opportunity of saving part 
of their returned property-tax, ... ,27 Thus, the money saved was lost as demand. Looking for a 
solution, Malthus concluded: 'Public works, the making and repairing of roads, anda tend-ency 
among persons of fortune to improve their grounds, and keep more servants, are the lD.ostBirect 
means within our power of restoring the demand for labor'l&. For most of his colleagues= this 
was a scandal: Malthus expected the remedy to come from the state (and thereby higb.er lL.:Xes), 
and the landlords (who accumulated fortunes thanks to the Corn Laws). 
26 Thomas Robert Malthus. The Grounds oj an Opinion on the Policy of Restricting the Importation of Foreign Co;-...rn, 
facsimile edition, Dusseldorf, J 996 (Klassiker der National6konomie, see footnote J 7 ), p. 25f 
" The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo, Volume II, Notes on Malthus, edited by Piero Sraffa, with the:=? 
collaboration of Maurice Dobb, Cambridge, 1976, p. 442f This yolume contains an almost complete reproductior=n of 
Malthus . Principles, 1820 edition. with numerous remarks by Ricardo. [t is thereby an excellent source jar the 
reconstruction of their discussions. 
" Ibid., p. 446. 
12 
Ricardo wrote in the margin ofMalthus' Principles 29: 'Mr. Malthus never appears to remernberr 
that to save is to spend, ... ' Behind this seemingly paradoxical remark stood the so-called 
'Say's Law', named after the French economist Jean-Baptiste Say (Traile d'Economie 
Politique, 1803). According to this 'law', every production creates its own demand. Everyone 
who offers something on the market, does so only with the purpose of buying afterwards . So~ 
every supply augments demand in the same proportion. Of course, there can be a parlia.l 
oversupply, accompanied by a partial lack of demand. For instance, there can be an oversupply 
of shoes, whereas most people want shirts. But such a situation would not last for long: The 
prices for shoes would fall , those for shirts would rise, and this would lead to a flow of capitan 
from shoes to shirt production. So, market forces would remedy such a disequilibrium, there 
was no need for intervention. But what happens, as Malthus has pointed at, if some people 
saved a part of their income? Isn't saved money lost as effective demand? It is not, said Say's 
followers. Saved money would be deposited, e.g. at banks, and from there it will be channeled 
in the form ofloans to investments, and thus again be effective on the demand side. The interest: 
rate played a crucial role: If there were more savings than loans, the interest rate would faiL 
This would simultaneously increase the demand for loans, and discourage saving. This way the 
rate of interest would bring savings and loans into equilibrium. This was a logically water-tight: 
argumentation. Malthus ' objections were dismissed by most economists. More than one-
hundred years later, John Maynard Keynes sighed: 'If only Malthus, instead of Ricardo, had 
been the parent stem from which nineteenth-century economics proceeded, what a much wiser 
and richer place the world would be to-day!'Jo. 
Ricardo ' s belief that unrestricted competition would deliver the solution to all social problems, 
gradually gave way to more doubtful reasoning. He inserted a new chapter, On Machinery, into 
the third edition of his Principles, where his astounded liberal followers could read. ' ... I am. 
,. Ibid .. p. 449. 
JO The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes. Volume X. Essays in Biography. London and Basingstoke. 1972, p. 
lOaf 
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convinced that the substitution of machinery for human labour, is often very injurio-us te:> the 
interests of the class of the laborers '31 . New machinery could increase profits and at t:he s.ame 
time reduce the gross income of the capitalists, of which the wages were paid. This vvas r1.ot a 
necessity, only a possibility, but ever since economic theory had a new subject to discuss: The 
threat of technological unemployment. 
John Stuart Mill, the last great exponent of British classical economy, vigorously defended the 
main tenets ofliberalism such as free trade or free competition. But he! also explicitly marked 
the limits of laissezjaire and compiled a list of tasks for the state to do: Primary educCl.tiol1,. the 
protection of children, social policy, lighthouses and geographical expeditions (common gc>ods 
in modem parlance), or the regulation of 'practical monopolies' such as gas and water works. 
He thereby expounded the principles of a new branch of liberalism, social liberalism . 
As a convinced 'Malthusian', Mill saw the reduction of the population increase as one of the 
major political tasks. Better education and infonnation of the laboring classes could help, but 
Mill also underlined the importance of social institutions in this context. For instance, he was 
a harsh critic of the system ofland tenure in Ireland: There the (usually English) landbrdcould 
rent the land out to the highest bidder, with a short lease. Under the conditions of a grovving 
population, this meant that Irish peasants were exposed to harsh competition from their 
neighbors. They had few incentives to improve the land and practically no incentives to keep 
their own numbers restricted. Whereas e.g. Tuscan metayers were protected by customary ~ong 
leases and 'could not be impoverished by any other improvident multiplication than tneir CJ>wn, 
.. . [an Irish] cottier family, however prudent and self-restraining, may have the rent ra:ised 
against it by the multiplication of other families .. . Is it not, then, a bitter satire on the I11lode 
in which opinions are fonned ... , to find public instructors of the greatest pretensions, irnplL 1:ing 
the backwardness oflrish industry, and the want of energy of the Irish people in improving their 
31 Ricardo. Principles (footnote 17 and 20). p . 388. 
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condition, to a peculiar indolence and insouciance in the Celtic race?,32 This is one example 
among many, where Mill integrated economic, sociological and cultural problems. 
As Smith and Ricardo before him, he saw the economy gradually approaching a 'stationary 
state'. But he saw no reason to worry: 'It is only in the backward countries of the world tl!at 
increased production is an important object: in those most advanced, what is economically 
needed is a better distribution'33. Humankind should even stop increasing production before all 
possibilities were used: Thereis not 'much satisfaction in contemplating the world with nothing 
left to the spontaneous activity of nature; with every rood ofland brought into cultivation, ... 
every flowery waste or natural pasture ploughed up, all quadrupeds or birds wltich are not 
domesticated for man's use extenninated as his rivals for food, ... '34. 
All in all, by the middle of nineteenth century, Political Economy was a well-established branch 
of academic and public opinion, and Britain's role as industrial pioneer seemed to vindicate t:he 
claim that the basic tenets of Political Economy were scientifically based. But not all were 
convinced that liberal industrial capitalism was already the end of history. 
Karl Marx 
Of the authors discussed here, Karl Heinrich Marx, born 1818 in Trier, was certainly the most 
ambitious. He intended to deliver an all-embracing analysis of capitalism, its place in history, 
and a comprehensive critique of all those who wrote on economic matters before him. Also 
" John Stuart Mill, Principles oJPolitical Economy With Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy, edited with 
an introduction by Sir William Ashley, Reprints of Economic Classics, Augustus M Kelley Publishers, Fairfield, NJ 
07006-0008, 1987,p. 321 and 324. 
JJ Ibid., p . 749. 
" Ibid., p. 750 . 
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writing about highly abstract and philosophical problems was for him very practical wod:, he 
was going to forge the intellectual weapon for the working class. 
The first volume of Das Kapital was published 1867 in Hamburg, being the only one which he 
properly finished. His friend Friedrich Engels published in 1885 and 1894 the second and third 
volumes, using a huge heap of papers which Marx has left at his death 1883. Marx: took his 
theoretical inspirations mainly from Classical German Philosophy, Classical British. Political 
Economy, and French Utopian Socialism, but also many other thinkers, and he mastered an 
enormous range of material in almost all kinds oflanguages. 
Das Kapital opens with an analysis of the commodity, i.e. a thing which is produced in order 
to be exchanged on the market. A commodity combined the qualities of having a concrete value 
in use (Gebrauchswert) and an abstract exchange value (Tauschwert). And commodities could 
be exchanged, and their values could be compared, because they had something in com.mon: 
They were all the product of human labor. But it is not the labor of individuals. It is the labor 
of persons who are seemingly independent, but who are all part of a societal organism. 'Their 
work is concrete work (konkrete Arbeit, producing useful things), but at the same time it is 
'societal labor' (abstrakte, or gesellschaftliche Arbeit). People perceive commodities as things, 
but as a matter of fact the commodities are the concretions of their own societal labor. Marx 
called the habit of seeing things, instead of social relations, 'commodity fetishism' 
(Warenfetischismus ). 
Commodities had value, Wert, according to amount of the labor which was necessary to 
produce it. 'Value' was the core of the matter (das Wesen), prices were the phenomena on the 
surface (Erscheinung). When a producer sells a commodity and buys another one, he owns in. 
the end a commodity of different usefulness, but the same value. 'The same value, i.e. the same 
quantum of concretized societal labor, remains in the hand of the same commodity owner, first 
in the form of his own commodity, then of the money, into which it was transformed, and.. 
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finally in the fonn of the commodity, into which this money was transformed ' 35. In other words, 
there is an equivalence between labor value and price. Market prices can temporarily diver ge 
from the value, but as average rule, as 'blindwirkendes Durchschnittsgesetz', the equivalence 
holds36 . 
The cases mentioned above, where peasants or weavers produced commodities by their o"Wn 
labor, sold them and bought commodities of another kind, form a kind of circle, commodity -
money - commodity (Ware - Geld - Ware), symbolically W-G- w: Marx grouped this under 
the heading 'Simple Commodity Circulation' (Einfache Warenzirkulation). In capitalism, 
however, the circle starts with money: The capitalist has money, buys materials and employs 
workers, and in the end he sells the final products, receiving more money than he had at the 
beginning. But here a problem appears: How can we have an exchange, value for value, and in 
the end have more than before? Symbolically, how can be G=W=G' valid, and at the same time 
G'>G? Of course, in the real world, some people cheat. But Marx analyzed the 'best ' capitalism 
conceivable, where everyone traded honestly under conditions of perfect competition.And even 
such a system is, as he tried to show (see below), based on exploitation, and therefore inhuman. 
Cheating and other evil things came on top of that. 
G' could be larger than G because the capitalist bought a commodity which had the peculiar 
capability of creating more value than it contains : Labor power (Arbeitskraft) . A capitalist does 
not buy labor, he rents labor power. The value of labor power is determined as that of all other 
commodities, by the amount oflabor which was necessary to produce it, i.e. the labor of raising, 
J' 'Derselbe Wert. d.h. dasselbe Quantum vergegenstiindlichter gesellschaftlicher Arbeit, bleibt in der Hand desselben 
Warenbesitzers in Gestalt erst seiner Ware, dann des Geldes, worin sie sich verwandelt, endlich der Ware, worin sich 
dieses Geld zurockverwandelt'. Karl Marx. Das Kapital. Kritik der p olilischen Okonomie. Erster Band. Buch I: Der 
Produktionsprozess des Kapilals (Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Werke. Band 23), B erlin (Os l), 1970. p . 172. 
J' Ibid., p . 117. See also p.18D, note 37, 'Die bestiindigen Oszillationen der Marktpreise ... reduzieren sich selbst zum 
Durchschnittspreis als ihrer inneren Regel '. But see also the addition at the end of this note, where prices were 
determined by labor values only 'in letzter /nstanz ', and where Marx states a systematic divergence be tween price and 
value. He explores this in the third volume. This correction has, however, not the s lightest influence on the reasoning in 
volume 1. 
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education, feeding, clothing, etc. The capitalist pays a wage which allows Ic:>r ~e reproduo_c lion 
of the labor power. The reproduction depends, however, also on the cultural levoel Of a COULOlltry, 
and the habits and demands of the workers. In this modified sense, the wages are sm bsistottence 
wages. The permanent introduction of new machinery and the concomitantu:Jlem]lloy-rnentl keep 
the wages down on this level. 
The worker, when working for the capitalist, creates more value than he rec eivoes as: wage::e. He 
creates a surplus value, Mehrwert. This exploitation of human labor power js til e Wesen o:cofthe 
capitalist profit. And a capitalist society is characterized by the existence or twe. mutt:n.lally 
dependent classes, the workers who are 'free ' to sell their labor power on the Irlarket, an~ the 
capitalists who own the means of production and can hire labor. And t he essence oft l' the 
historical genesis of capitalist society, as Marx graphically described, was the acculIJlulabcx:m of 
fortunes at one pole, and the often barbarous creation of 'free' laborers at the otmer,. e .g. blLY the 
expulsion of peasants from their soil during the enclosures37. 
However, two mechanisms will bring capitalism down. On the one hand, the p rofit rate ,; will 
decline: Technical progress implies ever bigger installations per labor unit. BlIt only 'li\f\.Jing' 
labor creates Mehrwert, which in proportion to the whole capital, shrinks. Capitalisnn will _ lose 
its dynamism, which also undermines it politically. And as Marx dernoJl.strated in a his 
'reproduction schemes' , capitalism grew only smoothly if a set ofcompllcated condi"tions\:I"'Were 
fulfilled simultaneously; this implied that recurrent crisjs was the norm, rather thana the 
exception, even before capitalism had reached its final stage. Furthermore, capitaliSlD. prod .. J.uces 
an ever larger working class, by ruining the masses of petty-bourgeois craftsmen ami peass.ants. 
In the end, the large, well-organized and class-conscious working class will dOVlllc:apital:I ism: 
J7 See chapter 24, 'Die sogenannle urspriingliche Akkumulation ', ibid., p. 741- 791. 
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'Die Stunde des kapitalistischen Privateigentums schliigt. Die Expropriateurs werden 
expropriiert' 38. 
At least in hindsight, it is obvious that Marx' story contains some flaws. For instance, there was 
never a working class revolution in a developed capitalist country, and class struggle and class 
consciousness are mainly phenomena of the past. But on the other hand, for many decades big 
parties and trade unions discussed matters in Marxian terms; somehow, they must have 
corresponded to experiences. And if we concentrate on the academic world, Marx' writings 
have inspired a huge array of research. Some sociologists, e.g. the Frankfurt School, have 
explored the problems of commodification and Warenfetischismus, others have structured 
various 'forms of living' according to Marxian categories39. Historians studied British 
economic history in Marxist perspectives, or e.g. the Making of the English Working Class40• 
Economists have usually been less impressed. They quickly found some inconsistencies in 
Marx's presentation. There is, point one, the equivalence between labor value and price. As 
Marx himself explored in the third volume, commodities cannot be exchanged at their labor 
values because a uniform profit rate makes prices diverge from it. We met this problem already 
with Ricardo. Marx tried to integrate these effects and introduced a new category, 
Produktionspreise, according to which commodities were exchanged. This is the famous 
Transformationsproblem : How do labor values get transformed into prices? But Marx' 
argumentation in the first volume on Warenaustausch, Arbeitskraji, Mehrwert etc. - see above-
rested on the assumption that prices were equivalent to labor values. We can say that his 
analysis of the capitalist profit rested on a theory which is only valid when the capitalist profit 
is zero (see above, table I and 2). Furthermore, Marx 'transformed' only the outputs into 
J8 Ibid., p . 791. 
J 9 Thomas Hojrup, Del Glemle Folk. Livsformer og Centroidirigering, Kobenhovn, 1989. 
" Eric. J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, Harmondsworth, 1979 (first edition 1968): E. P. Thompson, The Making of 
the English Working Class, Harmondsworth, 1991 (first edition 1963). 
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Produktionspreise, not the inputs. The same machine could enter his calculations at 
Produktionspreis, if it was sold as final product, and at the same time at labor value, when used 
as input. The last problem is, in principle, solvable by the use oflinear algebra. 
But before the reader feels like dismissing Marx completely, she should read what Nobel 
laureate Wassily Leontief said 1937 at the annual congress of the American Economic 
Association: Marx delivered a 'brilliant analysis of the long-run tendencies of the capitalistic 
system. The record is indeed impressive: increasing concentration of wealth, rapid elimination 
of small and medium sized enterprise, progressive limitation of competition, incessant 
technological progress accompanied by the ever growing importance of fixed capital, and, last 
not least, the undiminished amplitude of recurrent business cycles - an unsurpassed series of 
prognostications fulfilled, against which modem economic theory with all its refinement has 
little to show indeed'4]. Also business cycle analysis was clearly indebted to Marx: ' ... the three 
volumes of Capital helped more than any other work to bring the whole problem into the 
forefront of economic discussion'42. And: 'The significance of Marx ... is that of an 
inexhaustible source of direct observation. Much of present-day theorizing is purely derivative, 
secondhand theorizing'4). This critique has certainly not lost its relevance to-day. 
Marx saw capitalism as a profoundly unstable system, and it was unstable. The almost 'pure' 
capitalism which he studied was everywhere replaced by mixed economies with an elaborate 
welfare state. And the major forces to bring this about were, directly or indirectly, workers' 
parties and trade unions. The working class has downed capitalism. At least the one Marx 
analyzed. 
'I Wassily Leontief 'The Significance of Marxian Economics for Present-Day Economic Theory ', Th e American 
Economic Review, Vol. XXVII, No I, Supplement (March I938) , p . 5. 
" Ibid., p. 3. 
" Ibid. , p. 9. 
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Neo-Classical Economics, the 'Marginalist Revolution' and Mathematics 
By 1870, many of the key features of classical economics appeared to be obsolete. The 
Malthusian specter evaporated, birth rates declined, and real wages were rising. A capi1:aJist 
system seemed to be capable of sustained growth, there were no signs of declining profits, and 
agriculture, due to the progress in applied chemistry and mechanization, could produce food in 
ever larger quantities, at systematically falling costs. There were seemingly no naturalli rnits 
to growth. Furthermore, the advance of positivism made some questions look dubiolIs . Prices 
could be observed, but 'value' became for many a metaphysical category. All this led to a shift: 
in the priorities of economic research, and it was accompanied by a reformulation of some basic 
concepts44 • But economics turned also much more narrower. 
Problems of demography vanished from the agenda, and so did many of the sociological 
questions which Mill, not to say Marx incorporated in their analysis. Economics became 
divorced from history, and people lost interest in problems of long-term economic grom. 
Instead, the focus shifted to short-term price movements and market constellations. And since 
it could no longer be taken for granted that wages were at subsistence levels, the theory of 
distribution became reformulated. Now income was understood as a price for a contribution to 
production, and it was analytically determined in analogy to the price mechanism in the market. 
Most economists could see social problems and conflicts, but no systematic class struggle. Their 
analytical instruments turned more precise than the classical ones, but their world became also 
a little bit boring. Prices went up, others went down, but nothing dramatical really happened. 
Alfred Marshall, since 1885 at Cambridge, was perhaps the most influential economist of neo-
Classicism, as the new school, strangely enough, came to be called. In contrast to Smith and 
Ricardo, who saw demand as depending on the size of the population, but otherwise as being 
" For 0 comprehensive and graphic overview. see William J. Barber, A History ofEeonomic Thought, Harmondsw orth, 
1991, p 163-222. 
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rather stable, in Marshall's presentation demand and supply became functions of the price_ It 
could e.g. be supposed that customers demanded a bigger quantity of a certain good, if the price 
was falling. In principle, a whole row of price-quantity constellations was conceivable, which 
could be drawn into diagram, with the price on the x-axis and the quantities demanded at the 
y-axis. The result is a falling line. In analogy, a (usually rising) supply curve could be drawn 
into this diagram. At the intersection of the two curves we find the price-quantity constellation 
where supply equals demand. This 'Marshallian cross' has ever since entered practically all 
elementary textbooks. 
The aggregated demand curve for the whole market could be constructed by an horizontal 
addition of the individual demand curves. The same procedure was applicable on the supply 
side. And on both sides, the position of the curves could be described in 'marginal ' terms. What 
determines a demand curve? The customer's marginal utility curve. Ifhe owns already two pair 
of shoes, he buys a third one if, and only if, the marginal utility of the third pair is higher than 
the price. In the logical extreme, in infinitesimal perspective, price equals marginal utility. And 
as to the supply curve: A firm increases output if the price is higher than the marginal costs, i.e. 
the costs of producing the additional unit of output. Again, in the logical extreme, under 
conditions of perfect competition, price equals marginal costs. Shifting demand curves produce 
shifting prices, all according to the customers' marginal utilities. And since utility is a highly 
individual matter, the discussion of , value' dissolves into subjective perceptions of utility. Many 
neo-classical authors, in particular William Stanley levons, presented this 'subjective' theory 
of value' explicitly in opposition against the 'objective' value theory of Ricardo, Mill and Marx. 
But the 'marginalist revolution', as it came to be called, was much less revolutionary than it 
often is presented. The idea that prices rise when demand rises, is in fact older than classical 
economics. Smith and Ricardo insisted, however, that not all price levels have the same 
stability. As we have seen above: If prices rise, then profits and wages rise above their ordinary 
levels; and this induces an influx of capital and labor, which enlarges the supply of the 
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commodity, until the price level is back at the ordinary level. This means, in the longer run, it 
is the conditions of production plus the rate of profit which determine the price level, regardless 
of the position of the demand curve. In the longer run, with a given technique (and constant 
returns to scale), a rising demand increases the quantities produced, but not the price. So, in this 
sense, the classical and the neo-classical position do not exclude each other, they are di:fferent 
perspectives upon the same reality. 
The rise of neo-Classicism was accompanied by the increased application of mathematical 
method. A brilliant achievement in this context was the Elements d' economie politique pur e, 
by Leon Walras (1874-77). Walras analyzed an economy under perfect competition, translating 
various market constellations into a set of equations. As he could show, there exists a set of 
prices and quantities where all markets are in equilibrium simultaneously. And as he furtll.er 
showed, the economy, under specified conditions, gradually moves to this 'general 
equilibrium'. Before Walras, no one had ever shown that the 'partial' eqUilibrium in onemarJc:et 
is compatible with the equilibrium in other markets. 
The use of mathematics made it possible to express theorems in a conCise way . The 
interdependence and interplay of a wide range of factors could be cast into models which wen 
far more precise and consistent than those which only were formulated verbally. Furthennore, 
if models were fonnulated in the language of mathematics, they were open to furth.er 
mathematical transformation. This way, many new theoretical aspects could be extracted fro:m 
them. But there is one big problem associated with mathematics: In order to fonnulate problems 
in a formalized way, they must be simplified enormously. One identifies some variables which 
enter the game, but everything else gets completely discarded. Thereby, the spread of 
mathematics contributed to narrowing the range of economics. Furthermore, many 
mathematical economists seem to have lost interest in real economic problems, and dwelled 
instead in mathematical spheres which were superficially disguised as economic ones. 
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A simple example can perhaps illustrate the problems: We can fonnulate a Marshallian demaJ!1d 
curve by an equation, where p represents the price and q the quantity demanded, e.g. as 
p = 10 - 2q; we can also formulate a supply curve: p = 2 + 1.5q. When demand equals s"UppI.y, 
both equations must hold, and we can solve them as a system of simultaneous equations. Tille 
solutions are q = 2.29 and p = 5.34. This is a new result. It is an implicit consequence of tile 
formulation of the demand and supply curves. We could bring it into the open because we used 
mathematics. But have we really learned something new about economics? 
There has been a growing tendency in academic economics to regard only formalized texts a 
being 'real economics' . But this implies that many important economic problems, e. g. 
institutional problems, are disregarded. We shall encounter this problem again, when we discLLss 
DombuschlFischerlStartz at the end of this paper. 
Under the auspices of neo-Classicism, academic economics became a truly intemation..al 
discipline for the first time. There were various schools with their particularities each, notab ly 
in Cambridge, Lausanne, Vienna, and the USA, but as to the basic methodological concepts and 
focus of interest, they were united. But they were not without opponents. 
The Historical Schools, Institutional Economics, and the Problems of Specialization 
In some countries, notably Germany, neo-Classicism hardly made inroads for a longtime. M(;st 
German economists regarded abstract models, seemingly void of any real life, with suspicio:n. 
Around 1840, many of them, notably Friedrich List, perceived the spreading of Anglo-Saxon 
economics also as a kind of cultural imperialism, and as kind of ideological support for British 
economic dominance. Something similar happened e.g. in Ireland. Most German economis:ts 
stressed instead the importance of the detailed study of real situations in their historic al 
development. Instead of drawing diagrams or solving equations, they wrote books abo"llt 
economic and social history, from medieval or ancient times to modernity. Some, e.g. Gustav 
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Schrnoller, had considerable political influence, by educating civil servants and taking a 
prominent part in the deliberations about the German social security legislation. 
The exponents of the German (or Irish) Historical School have often, in comparison to maLny 
'model builders ' , been vastly superior as to the knowledge of real economic situations. They 
suffered, however, from the problem that they often were not fully aware of the point taat f<!Lets 
do not speak for themselves. If they could observe a fall in the German grain prices, was t:::I1.at 
due to cheap Russian and American imports? Or to the process of mechanization of agricultu..Jl:'e? 
Or better weather conditions? In order to find out, you have to use an explicit hypothesis, \V"ith 
specified premises (in particular, if several components enter the picture). That is what -the 
'model builders' deliver. And already the selection of the topics which enter the historical stllc::ly, 
involves theoretical questions. These methodological shortcomings made the Historical Schc::>ol 
die out somewhere between the World Wars. 
We can see the split between abstract economic theory and economic history as a kind of 
division ofIabor, and according to Smith, more division oflabor means progress. But is it rea..1.1y 
progress, if experts know more and more about fields which tum smaller and smaller? In "the 
end, they might know everything about nothing. Perhaps the solution lies in specializ:;ed 
research, and continuous efforts to synthesize again. 
A similar split opened between economy and sociology. Neo-Classical models can only wCl>rk 
if a long row of institutional conditions are met. To give one example: Competition produc::es 
beneficial results only if property rights are guaranteed. If it were allowed to bum down the 
competitor's factory, the general welfare certainly would not be enlarged by this kind of 
competition. Formulated more generally: Capitalism can work only ifrule oflaw and effecti.. ve 
legal systems are in place. The same can be said about good banking regulations, accountLng 
rules, an impartial state bureaucracy, a good educational system, and many other institutioll:ls. 
For Mill and Marx these aspects were an integral part of their research program. Later, also the 
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so-called institutional economists in the USA, or Max Weber in Gennany, explored thesse 
problems. But many neo-c1assical economists have had a tendency to overlook their imporunc~, 
or to take everything for granted. We shall meet this problem again at the end of this paper. 
The 'Keynesian Revolution' and the 'Neo-Classical Synthesis' 
The economists' faith in the prospects of capitalism was severely shaken by the (Jrea:1.t 
Depression, from 1929 onwards. Under these conditions, The General Theory of ErnploY7TIenz, 
Interest and Money, by John Maynard Keynes45 (I936), had a colossal impact on Anglo·Saxo3:1 
economics . Reading the book several decades later, it is perhaps difficult to imagine why it onc~ 
thrilled its readers to the bones. The book contains, among a few vividly-written parts, Jrnan::::y 
lengthy dry passages, and it is badly organized, with numerous superfluous digressions. Man::::y 
lines of argumentation are mere speculation. Obviously, Keynes wrote the book in some haste:. 
Or, as one of his former students reports: 'Preparing the General T7zeoryforpublication, tl1ougJi::I 
it was done very quickly, was for him disappointingly slow. He was desperate to present it teo 
the world that, he felt, needed it'46. 
Keynes presented a theory which explained why capitalism had fallen into a prolonged crisis= . 
He directed the focus again on effective demand, a problem which has passed into oblivio~ 
since Malthus. Keynes introduced an 'aggregate demand function' which related various level:s 
of demand, consumption in particular, to levels of income. As with Marshall's cross, thi:s 
function, and the corresponding diagrams, are by now part of most textbooks, including 
DombuschlFischerlStartz47 . In 1936 it was a novelty, loaded with consequences. AssuIning C3 
" John Maynard Keynes. The General Theory of Employment. Interest and Money (The Collected Writings of Joltn 
Maynard Keynes. volume VIJ). Macmillan. Cambridge University Press. 1986. 
" L. Tarshis, 'Keynesian Revolution', The New Pa/grave. A Dictionary of Economics, edited by John Eatwell, Munay 
Milgate, Peter Newman, London and Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1987. volume 3, 1987, p.47·50, esp. P. 50. 
" Dornbusch/FischerIStartz, op. Cit. (footnote I) , p.188·2IO. 
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'marginal propensity to consume' smaller than one, it followed that a growing econOIoycQuld 
meet the problem of an insufficient consumption level. Within the neo-c1assical VIIorld (wbich 
Keynes called 'classical '), this was not really a problem; insufficient consumption meant n::lOre 
saving, but saving would be transformed, via loans, into investment. The rate of interest - see 
Say's Law above - brought investment and saving into balance. But Keynes attacked S2Y'S law 
exactly at its central point, the rate of interest. As he pointed out, the economic agents ll.ave 
often good reasons not to spend their money, but to hold it in liquid forms ('liquidity 
preference'); and this liquid money was lost for demand. The interest rate, being the result of 
the supply and demand for money, including the demand for liqUidity, was thereby usually 
higher than the 'classics' assumed. It was not the interest rate, but output which brougll.t saving 
and consumption into balance; if output fell far enough, there was less saving, and the excess 
of saving over demand disappeared. Under these conditions, the economy could easily fall i nto 
an eqUilibrium with unemployment: 'Indeed it [the economic system] seems capable of 
remaining in a chronic condition of sub-normal activity for a considerable period witnout 2ny 
market tendency either towards recovery or towards complete collapse. Moreover, the evidence 
indicates that full , or even approximately full, employment is of rare and short·li ved 
occurrence '48. 
Wages are rather inflexible, in particular downwards. Also this rigidity obstructed, or COllIse, 
the functioning of the markets and the return to full employment. But according to lC.eynes a 
wage reduction would not help because, among other effects, it would reduce aggregate 
demand. He concluded: ' .. .I am now of the opinion that the maintenance of a stable general 
level of money-wages is, on the balance of considerations, the most advisable policy for a 
closed system; whilst the same conclusion will hold for an open system, provided that 
" Keynes, op. cit. , p . 249/ 
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equilibrium with the rest of the world can be secured by means of fluctuating exchanges ri.e. 
re-ldevalutations} '49. 
The state had to stabilize aggregate demand at the appropriate level. As an implicatioIl of his 
aggregate demand function, Keynes showed that fiscal expenses could generate income effects 
that were substantially higher; also this kind of 'multiplier' analysis has ever since becOIn.e a 
central part of economic textbooks, including DombuschfFischerlStartz50. When it came to the 
job of stabilizing demand, Keynes regarded fiscal policy (higher government expenses) as 
being more effective than monetary policy (i.e. enlargement of the money supply, in order to 
generate lower interest rates) . Under certain conditions, expansionist monetary policy wO'1.lld 
have no effect at all , all cheap money would only be hoarded as liquid assets (' liquidity trap' ). 
Fonnulating it more generally, according to Keynes, money was not just an innocent means of 
economic exchange. It could produce grave disturbances . But on the other hand, ' .. . if our 
controls succeed in establishing an aggregate volume of output corresponding 10 filII 
employment as nearly as is practicable, the classical theory comes into its own again from this 
point onwards,51. 
His 'revolution' was therefore only partial. Keynes was profoundly influenced by his teac:her 
Marshall, and most of the General Theory is written in Marshallian language. That was perhaps 
a reason for its success; his colleagues could understand Marshallian. On the other han d, 
Keynes was presumably more open to new developments than many other economists becau se 
he worked much outside the academic world. He gave lectures at Cambridge and edited -the 
" Ibid.,p. 270. 
" Ibid. 
jJ Ibid., p. 378. 
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Economic Journal, but he earned his living by managing the assets of an insurance company, 
When talking about money and liquidity, he knew what he was talking about. 
The General Theory inspired, almost right from its publication, a long range of further 
economic research, Keynesian ideas became quickly popularized, but also modified. Of 
particular relevance was an article of just twelve pages, by Sir John Hicks: Mr, Keynes anrI the 
Classics52, Hicks integrated some central Keynesian concepts into suggestive diagrams, the 
famous IS-LM-model (SI-LL, in Hick's original notation), in order to capture the munal 
interdependence between monetary phenomena and the sphere of production, Also the IS-LM· 
model entered the hard core of the textbook-literature, DombuschlFischerlStartz includedsl, and 
it has served as a frame for economic research and debate for decades54 , The IS-LM·model is, 
however, not without problems, For instance, the IS-curve depicts flow-equilibria, whereas the 
LM-curve shows stock-equilibria, a point that bothered Hicks severely, Another problem is 
hidden in the assumption that the curves are independent of each otherS, 
Another Keynesian, or perhaps better pseudo-Keynesian, success was the 'Phillips curve' . In 
its original version of1958 it depicted a statistical connection between unemployrnentand wage 
increases, later between unemployment and inflation. It soon entered the textbooks through.out 
the world. It was 'Keynesian' in the sense that it supplied the notion of inflexible wages with 
statistical material. The Phillips curve seemed, however, also to indicate that it was possible to 
combat unemployment with higher inflation. This kind of policy also became labeled as 
"John Hicks, 'Mr. Keynes and the Classics: a suggested interpretation', Econometrica 5, April 1937, p. 14 7·59. 
53 Dornbusch/Fischer/Startz, op. cit" p. 211-237. 
" Axel Lejonhuvud, 'JS-LM analysis', The New Palgrave. A Dictionary of Economics, edited by John Earwell, Murray 
Milgate, Peter Newman, London and Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1987, volume 3, 1987, pp. /002-f004, esp. p . 1002. 
" fbi ., p. 1003! For a newer discussion, see reodoro Daria rogati, Keynes and the Neo-Classical Synthesis. 
Einsteinian versus Newtonian Macroeconomics, Routledge, London and New York, 1998, p . 91-10. 
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'Keynesian'. But Keynes took inflation very seriously, he endeavored to show that his pDlicy 
recommendations had, under the given conditions, no inflationary effects56. 
To sum up, some Keynesian perspectives soon became an integrated part of academic 
economics. But Keynes' specter of instability was soon, so to speak, compressed into a bottle 
which was locked by a cork on which was written: 'Only short-term'. This operation was called 
the 'neo-classical synthesis', a term coined by Paul A. Samuelson in the 1950s57• But the:re is 
not much classical in this 'synthesis'. At least, of the richness of the discussions of Classical 
Political Economy, little is left. 'Classical' is more a label which is glued on to all models that 
assure us that everything is going to be all-right in the longrun. So, the term ' synthesis ' is rather 
misleading. 'Medley' would perhaps be more appropriate. 
The 'synthesis' came under severe attack in the 1970s, but it seemed to have survived, albeit 
with modifications. It forms the foundation of DombuschlFischerlStartz's presentation. 
Monetarism, 'New Classical Economics', Ecologism, and the Present State of the 
'Synthesis' 
During the 1950s and 1960s, most economists saw no reason for profound worries, so they were 
busy refining the 'synthesis ', e.g. by the elaboration of huge econometric models, basi~ally 
dis aggregations of the IS-LM-schemes. The ' synthesis' had, however, left many loose emds. 
There was, for instance, a gap between macroeconomics, where instability was admitted, and 
the neo-classical micro economic models where markets find their equilibrium automatically. 
" Keynes, op. Cil., p. 292-312. 
" Olivier Jean Blanchard, 'neoclassical synlhesis', The New Palgrave. A Dictionary ojEconomics, edited by Jolm 
Eatwell, Murray Milgate, Peter Newman, London and Basingstake, Macmillan, 1987, volume 3, 1987, pp. 634 -636. 
esp. p . 634. 
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The reality of the 1970s, with a combination of high inflation. high unemployment and h:igh 
budget deficits, paved the ground for two massive attacks on the dominating paradigrn~ in 
particular on the Keynesian ingredients of the blend. Blaming Keynes for chronical budget 
deficits or high inflation rates was as unjust as bringing Malthus in connectioIl with 
contraceptives, but that's what happened. 
The Monetarists, led by Milton Friedman, of Chicago University, endeavored to show, on the 
basis of much empirical evidence, that monetary policy mattered much more than usually 
assumed. Business cycles, which Keynes and others attributed to fluctuations in aggregate 
demand, could in many cases better be explained by monetary contractions. These were 
substantial findings, and they justly found wide response. Friedman and others proposed, 
however, a rigorous monetary policy: The authorities should let the money stock grow 
according to prefixed targets. Apart from that, the government should abstain from any kind of 
stabilization policy, the markets could do better. If governments wanted to combat 
unemployment, they could do so by supply-side economics. This was again a substantial 
proposal because supply-side problems had been neglected by many Keynesians. But according 
to the monetarists, supply-side policy was the only appropriate thing. 
The monetarist proposals had severe flaws. Just to mention one point, by arguing for a stably-
growing money stock, they used the so-called Quantity Theory of Money, which already 
Ricardo and Malthus had discussed. This theory can be expressed as an equation: 
Real GDP x Price Level = Money stock x Velocity of Money. 
This equation is a kind of tautology. It says, for instance, that the price level will rise ifwe 
enlarge the money stock, real GDP and velocity being stable. Ifwe let the money stock grow, 
the GDP being stable, and we cannot observe rising prices, then the money velocity has 
increased. The equation is always right. 
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Friedman and his followers assumed, however, that the velocity is constant. Under this 
condition, increases in the money supply necessarily produce inflation. But what happens I f we 
cannot assume the velocity to be constant? That was exactly one of Keynes ' issues. And Vl'hat 
happens if markets do not exhibit that kind of inherent stability which the Monetarists assur:ne~ 
when they demanded total neutrality of fiscal policy? Furthermore, the monetary aggregates 
(MI·M3) often diverge considerably, so which target should be chosen? Some moneta.:rists 
advocated the monetary base. DombuschlFischerlStartz, presumably Stanley Fischer,co11lll1lent: 
'The problem with monetary-base targeting is that the Fed might be hitting the bull's eyeoD the 
money-base target while completely missing the ultimate targets of policy. Unpredictable 
changes in the money multiplier and in velocity break the tight link between the money b ase 
and nominal GDP' 58. 
For a short time, in 1979, when the US Federal Reserve Board accepted monetary targeting, the 
monetarist cause seemed to be victorious. But this was an iIIusion. According to Paul Krugman 
the Fed practiced 'judo-politics'. The Fed directors thought that a monetary contraction -was 
necessary, which, they knew, would produce a recession. By seemingly taking over monetarist 
recommendations, they could pass the blame for the recession over to their monetarist critics. 
As soon as the recession was over, there was no reason for playing this game any more . In 
Krugman's words: 'From a monetarist perspective, Federal Reserve policy after 1982 -was 
nothing short of scandalous. The rate of money growth shifted erratically, sometimes rising to 
double digits, sometimes becoming negative [as it was the case with the Bundesbank, Jf. z.]. 
For several years after the abandonment of targets, monetarists - Friedman in particular· 
routinely forecast a disastrous acceleration of inflation andlor a severe recession as a resu11 of 
monetary instability. Yet the actual result was remarkably smooth sailing, ... Milton Friedman's 
forecasts of doom were at first taken seriously, then ridiculed, then ignored'59. 
sa Dornbusch/Fischer/Startz, op. cit., p . 384! 
" Paul Krugman, Th e Age of Diminished Expectations. US Economic Policy in the 1990s, revised and updated editi<ln, 
MIT Press, Cambridge/Mass.-London, 1996, p . 107. 
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The monetarist offensive had revealed many weak points in the standard ' neo-c1assical 
synthesis', and it gave important impulses for the renewed discussion of the role and importance 
of monetary and fiscal policy under different conditions. But as an all-out offensive against tl1e 
dominant blend of Keynesian and neo-classical theoretical ingredients, it was a failure. 
DombuschlFischerlStartz reflects this. 
The second great attack on the 'synthesis ' came under the banner of 'New Classical Economics' 
(NCE). In contrast to monetarism, their followers only seldom hit the headlines, but the JI 
conquered some strongholds in the academic world. Also the NCE partisans could successfull-y 
point at inconsistencies in the standard paradigm, and give impulses to the debate. Robert 
Lucas, who received the Nobel Prize in 1995, effectively criticized many econometric rnodel.s 
for assuming rational agents , but at the same time attributing wrong expectations to them. A..s 
the monetarists, the followers of NCE have been highly critical of fiscal policy, but the::y 
declared even changes in monetary policy, if anticipated, to be without effects. They expl aine.d 
economic fluctuations instead by sudden contractions on the supply-side (,Real Business 
Cycles'); the economy could best be understood assuming that markets are always iE 
equilibrium, and that they adjust instantaneously. This assumption has been rather unappealin1'l 
to most economists. And indeed, it is absurd. The idea of the irrelevance of monetary polic:::y 
was, for instance, quite effectively falsified by the recession of I 979- 8 I, which was caused b:::y 
the above-mentioned, pre-announced restrictive policy of the Fed. Other studies show the same. 
All in all, NCE has stimulated some interesting academic debates , but it has not revolutionizec:l 
economics. DombuscQlFischerlStartz deems NCE important enough to devote quite some spac.e 
to it60, in order to dismiss it in the end. Obviously, they find Greg Mankiw's models, whi ch tr.:Y 
to bridge the gap between Keynesian macroeconomics and microeconomics, thereby closin~ 
'" Dornbusch/Fischer/Startz, op. cit., p . /55· /80. 
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an open flank of the' synthesis', to be far more relevant ('breakthrough', 'milestone in the New 
Keynesian counterrevolution')60. 
Finally, the implicit growth optimism of the 'synthesis' has been challenged on ecological 
grounds. The 'Report to the Club of Rome' in the 1970s postulated 'limits to growth', due to 
the exhaustion of resources. But in 1999, these limits are further away than ever. Models which 
postulate limits to growth invariably contain the flaw that they assume that we go on producing 
exactly the same way. Then, certainly, we run into severe trouble after a while. But the very 
essence of economic growth is producing differently. Ecological problems have to be taken 
seriously, but there is nothing insurmountable about them. Just to give one example, technically 
all human energy production could be based on solar energy today. But the high prices prevent 
that for the time being. There exists by now a vast literature on the economy of ecological 
problems and policies. But this literature is completely compatible with the foundations of the 
synthesis. As a matter of fact, already in the 1930s Arthur Cecil Pigou, a neo-classical 
economist, developed the concept of 'external effects', one of the most important tools for 
analyzing ecological problems. 
Unorthodox writers such as Herman Daly or Nicolas Georgescu-Roegen see humanity 
completely on the wrong track. Daly wants to introduce a 'stationary state' and quotes, among 
others, John Stuart Mill, but his line of reasoning has not much to do with Mill. Daly argues that 
the thermodynamic laws dictate that we cannot create new energy, only transform energy from 
low to high entropy, where it is less accessible. So our time is running out. Certainly. But the 
entropy laws do not constitute an economic barrier until the sun stops burning. Without 
mentioning them by name, DornbuschIFischerlStartz had presumably Daly and Georgescu-
Roegen in mind when they wrote: ' .. . this seems to be more of a concern for a course In 
60 Ibid. , pp. 183f 
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astrophysics, or perhaps theology, than for a course in economics'62. So, ecological problelIJ.s 
became a new field of economic studies, but they did not shake the theoretical foundations of 
the 'synthesis'. 
Some Concluding Remarks 
Arriving, after a voyage through the history of economic thought, at DombuschlFiscllerlStartz, 
we observe, point one, that the dominant paradigm seems to have found some kind of 
equilibrium for the time being. The blend of Keynesian and neo-classical ingredients has 
survived, with modifications and refinements and more emphasis on monetary problems than 
some 20 years ago. As to the fundamental structure, the monetarist and NeE attacks have failed. 
And given the intense political debate about the questions discussed, the wealth of experiences 
and empirical studies, many of them quoted in the DombuschlFischerlStartz, we may conclude 
that macroeconomic stabilization policies in countries such as the US rest on a rather stable 
tlleoretical basis. 
Reading DombuschlFischerlStartz, we observe further that obviously only problems that allow 
for mathematization are allowed to enter the fields of Macroeconomics. The reader is spared 
the technicalities, but almost everything is figures, variables, diagrams. Qualitative reasoning, 
perhaps on institutions, or mentalities, or human propensities, hardly exists. Ricardo's 
methodology seems to be uncontested, and for stabilization policy it seems to work. 
But DombuschlFischerlStartz displays also a strangely static view of society. When discussing 
macroeconomics, it should be an obvious problem to discuss why the role of government and 
public sector has so dramatically increased, up to one third ofGDP in the US and two thirds in 
Sweden and Finland? The welfare state is not their subject, despite of its vast economic 
" bid., p . 74. 
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implications. They discuss, in a way, a fictive market economy where the role of the state 
consists mainly in ensuring that there is enough good money, and that govemmentexpenses and 
taxes have the right effect on aggregate demand. Otherwise, the content of these government 
expenses is of no real relevance to them. 
When comparing their book with Smith, Ricardo, Marx, over even Marshall, we notice that "the 
range of issues has narrowed enonnously. F or instance, they seem to be hardly interested in "the 
social consequences of economic policies. Social groups hardly exist, there are mainly 
households. 
In more general terms, society and social and historical change lie outside. The book deals 
almost exclusively with short-term problems. The long run appears mostly as models 
postulating that the markets come into balance again by themselves. A few problems of long· 
tenn growth are treated in chapters 3 and 4, but they are disappointingly thin. We learn 
something about savings, investment and growth rates, but the point that longer growth al so 
means profound social (and political) change, from agricultural society to industrial society to 
service and information society, each with distinct social groups and social problems, does not 
enter the book. These problems were at the very center of the work of Smith or Marx. 
And strangely enough: When companng growth rates of vanous countries, 
Dornbusch/Fischer/Startz approvingly quotes Robert E. Lucas: 'Is there some actioll a 
government ofIndia could take that would lead the Indian economy to grow like Indonesia's 
or Egypt's? Ifso, what exactly? Ifnot, what is it about the 'nature ofIndia' which makes it so? 
The consequences for human welfare involved in questions like these are simply staggering. 
Once one starts to think about them, it is hard to think about anything else '63. 
6J Ibid .. p . 63. 
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Right. But then, our authors leave these staggering questions aside, apart from a few pages. The 
reason for this striking omission lies presumably again in the way DornbuschlFischerlStartz 
defines the area of macroeconomics. It is impossible to discuss the economic perspectives of 
India without talking about institutions and traditions, about education, rule of law, or 
demography, all problems which Mill, Marx or Weber debated thoroughly, but which o-ur 
authors regard as lying outside their field. But what kind of economics is it that is not willing 
to discuss the most staggering economic problems of the world? 
The necessity of discussing institutions is most obvious in the case of developing countries. B l.lt 
it is certainly also important for advanced economies. Between 1970 and 1991, the index ~f 
Great Britain's GDP per inhabitant at purchase power parities (OECD-average= 100) fell fro:rn 
93 to 88, whereas Germany's rose from 105 to 11064 • Has Germany simply been lucky? Or is 
it the labor market institutions, with a lower conflictuality in Germany than in Britain? Or has 
Germany's education system been better? According to DombuschlFischerlStartz, human 
capital is extremely important for long-term growth. But they devote not even one page to tlLis 
subject65• 
In 1999 Stanley Fischer had ample opportunities to discuss the economic importance of 
institutions. The IMF, of which he is first deputy director, has been massively criticized fort1:s 
handling of the problems of countries such as Russia. Joseph Stiglitz, chief economist oftbe 
World Bank, has been most outspoken. As reported by the Economist: 'Mr Stiglitz says much 
of this dismal performance [of the Russian economy] stems from the intellectual inadequacies 
of the previous approach. There was, he argues, too much emphasis on macroeconomic 
stabilization at the expense of institution-building ... It would have been better, argues r.-1r 
Stiglitz, to have proceeded more slowly - building a regulatory framework before privatization, 
" OEeD National Accounts, as quoted in Nya vil/kor for ekonomi och polilik. Ekonomikommissionens jOrs/ag, (StatelZS 
offentliga utredningar /993:16), Stockholm, 1993, p. 13. 
" Dornbusch/Fischer/Startz, op. cit. ,p. 46/ 
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and concentrating on strengthening the rule of law and on creating effective institutions, sllch 
as courts. He likens the misguided zeal with which Russian refoTII1ers and their western advisors 
[such as Stanley Fischer, WZj set about changing a society overnight to that oftheJacol>ins 
and, yes, the Bolsheviks '66. 
We are in no position to judge whether the IMF mishandled the Russian problems. But we can 
state that the same kind of 'intellectual inadequacies', which Joseph Stiglitz sees at the IMP, 
we can find in reading DornbuschlFischerlStartz. 
66 The Economist. September 18" 1999, p. 93. As a malter offact. Dornbusch/Fischer/Stortz. op. cit., pp.72-74, very 
briefly deal with Russia, and they mention institutional problems too. 'This agenda is overwhelming •. . Since all 
changes are interdependent, ideally they should all take place at once'. So they were 'set about changing a society 
overnight '? And how come that China could introduce some reforms without changing everything at once? See also 
Stanley Fischer, 'What went wrong in Russia ', Financial Times, 27 September 1999, p. 16, and Paul Welfens, 'Whot 
went wrong at the IMF', Financial Times, 5 October 1999, p. 17. 
38 
Discussion Papers Series 
Copies ofthe Discussion Papers are available for DKK. 25,- each. 
1. Mark Juergensmeyer 
The Limits oJGlobalization in the 21st Century: Nationalism, Regionalism and 
Violence. 1997 
2. Vlf Hedetoft 
The Nation State Meets the World: National Identities in the Context ofTransnatio-
nality and Cultural Globalisation. 1997 
3. David Mitchell 
New Borders for Education: Redefining the Role and Sites of Education in the 
Future. 1998 
4. Robert Chr. Thomsen 
An Alternative to Canada? A Comparative Analysis oj the Development of Region-
alism in Scotland and the Atlantic Provinces of Canada. 1998 
5. Flemming Christiansen 
Hakka: The Politics of Global Ethnic Identity Building. 1998 
6. Madeleine Demetriou 
Towards Post-Nationalism? Diasporic Identities and the Political Process. 1999 
7. Peter Mandaville 
Reimagining the Umma: Transnational Spaces and the Changing Boundaries of 
Muslim Political Community. 1999 
8. Wolfgang Zank 
The Complexities of Comparative Advantages. 1999 
9. Riva Kastoryano 
Transnational Participation and Citizenship. Immigrants in the European Union. 
1999 
10. UlfHedetoft 
Pleasure Into Sport: On the National Uses of Bodily Culture. 1999 
II . Malene Gram 
National Socialisation and Education: A comparison of ideals for the upbringing of 
children and the school systems in France, Germany and the Netherlands. 1999 
12. Susan Berry Baca 
Cultural Currency and Spare Capacity in Cultural Dynamics:Toward resolving the 
have-is debate. 1999 
